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In this paper I present a recent case in theoretical cosmology, and argue on its basis that explanatory 
considerations can play a crucial role in epistemically justifying theory choice. Much of the philosophical 
debate over whether explanatory power is an epistemic theoretical virtue has centered on general 
philosophical considerations, for example underdetermination arguments and whether inference to the 
best explanation (IBE) is a generically valid form of reasoning (especially for its applicability to the 
scientific realism debate). Attending to the specific roles that explanation plays in scientific 
methodology, especially the way it structures discourse in a discipline and coordinates exemplars, 
reveals the possibility of justifying explanatory power as an epistemic virtue in specific scientific cases, 
without reliance on general philosophical arguments based on IBE or underdetermination. This kind of 
argument naturally requires close attention to the historical development of a theory and its 
applications.  
 
Inflationary cosmology, I claim, offers just such a compelling, concrete example. Inflation is a 
cosmological scenario that was originally proposed in the early 1980s by Alan Guth. It was widely 
accepted in the community immediately after its introduction, and remains a central pillar of the 
contemporary standard model of cosmology, the ?CDM model. Inflationary theory is based on the 
supposition that the very early universe underwent a brief period of accelerated and exponential spatial 
expansion. Proponents claim that the effect of inflation is to flatten the spatial geometry of the universe 
and make its contents more uniform. (One may usefully compare it to the inflation of a balloon, which 
decreases the curvature of the balloon’s surface and smooths small irregularities.) This mechanism is 
thought to operate for a short period in the very early universe, giving rise to the conditions that 
eventuate in the present spatial flatness and uniformity, conditions which we infer today from 
observations of the cosmic microwave 
background (CMB) radiation. Proponents also claim that the old standard cosmological model, the well-
known hot big bang (HBB) model, suffers from fine-tuning problems. Earman and Mostern have 
emphasized that these fine-tuning problems are not problems concerning the HBB model’s consistency 
or empirical adequacy, since the model is capable of explaining the present flatness and uniformity of 
the universe; rather the problems appear to raise concerns over the kind of explanation given by the 
model for certain physical features of the universe which are accessible to observation. In particular, 
only explanatorily-definicient special initial conditions can give rise to these presently- observed 
conditions within the context of the HBB model. Since uniformity and flatness are thought to be natural 
outcomes of inflation, the previous paradigm’s fine-tuning problems are apparently solved by 
inflationary theory, thus leading to the claim that inflationary models represent real theoretical progress 
over the HBB model. 
 
Although inflation was widely accepted ostensibly on the basis of such fine-tuning arguments during 
inflationary theory’s early history, at present the best argument for inflationary theory is not that it 
(allegedly) solves these problems; instead it rests on the striking empirical confirmation in the 90s of 
quantum mechanical predictions developed out of the inflationary framework, specifically of a very 
precise spectrum of anisotropies of the cosmic microwave background (CMB). If this latter, empirical 
argument is successful and it at least appears to be taken as such by most contemporary cosmologists 
then inflationary theory should reasonably be considered an empirically successful theory whose 
predictive successes go beyond the HBB model, and therefore represent progress over it. Yet it is 
important to note that these predictions were unforeseen at the time of inflation’s proposal and initial 
acceptance. How then is it, that a theory, seemingly unjustified on any of the commonly accepted 
epistemic grounds, should later find itself strikingly confirmed observationally? The case appears to be 
one of extraordinary epistemic luck, roughly, epistemic success achieved through a method no more 
effective than guessing. Yet supposing it so is quite implausible, for epistemic luck in the confirmation of 
central scientific theories would severely threaten intuitive notions of scientific progress and rationality. 
The alternative to such skepticism is to consider that inflation’s rapid and early acceptance among 
cosmologists was somehow epistemically justified prior to any observational support, and on grounds 
other than observational support or solving theoretical inadequacies in the Standard Model. Therefore 
the case of inflation shows us that a view of epistemic justification based solely on the simple and 
familiar criteria of empirical adequacy and theoretical consistency (in particular as employed by Earman 
and Mostern in their assessment of inflation) is inadequate. 
 
I claim that the epistemic justification of inflationary theory (before its observational confirmation) rests 
instead crucially on explanatory considerations, considerations which may be seen to arise from its 
approach to solving the HBB model’s fine-tuning problems and explaining presently observed 
cosmological conditions. One might wonder, “How can solving such mere explanatory problems 
represent progress towards an empirically successful theory?” Insofar as scientific progress may be 
gauged by solving scientific problems (la Kuhn or Laudan), one has, I claim, an explanatory story linking 
inflationary theory’s putative success at solving the HBB model’s fine-tuning problems with the later 
confirmation of its observational predictions. Roughly speaking, one might say that by solving the HBB 
model’s conceptual problems, inflationary theory proves itself to be a progressive research program 
suitable for further development and empirical test. This viability depends on a certain kind of “meta-
empirical” confirmation. Although, certainly, there is no guarantee that its predictions will be borne out, 
one’s confidence in the theory is justified by its past problem-solving success. The viability of some such 
story of course depends however on whether inflation does in fact solve the HBB model’s fine-tuning 
problems in some sense, but this argument sketch makes considerably more sense of the historical 
development of inflationary theory than an impoverished view of empirical justification in science can. 
 
